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ABSTRACT 
This paper analyze'> an appropriate methodology for studying discriminatory credit 
rationing in rural credit programs with fixed interest rates. The paper demonstrates 
that in order to analyze credit discrimination one should have a well-defined loan 
demand and supply model. The criteria by which loan applications are accepted or 
rejected should be explicitly incorporated into the analysis. The paper also demon-
strates that the estimation of the model should consider not only data on loans granted 
but also on loans rejected. Finally, the empirical analysis implemented in this study 
shows that this loan demand and supply model is quite adequate for analyzing the dis-
crilllinatory policies follow<.'d for a rural credit program in Portugal after the 1974 
l~evolut ion. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Non-price rationing in credit markets, as a substantive issue of theory and poHcy, 
is a subject not only of primary importance, but of considerable controversy. During 
the past three decades many low income countries (hereafter called LICs) created a 
variety of specialized agricultural lending institutions organized to provide to predeter-
mined group(s) of rural producers, regions, and/or agricultural activities with agricul-
tural loans at subsidized rates of interest. II was believed that by providing targeted 
crcdil to some group(s) of rural producers (or regions) they could be induced to use 
more modern technologies lo accderall' agricultural growth. Contrary to these explx--
tations, however, available c1npirical evidence suggests that mosl rural credit programs 
imple1n~ntcd in LICs have failed to reach their intcnd(:d clientele, with credit ofkn 
di vertcd to the large::.l and most infl ucn Lial producers, thus worsening rural innHnt.~ dis-
tribution [Gonzalez-Vega, 1 984b]. 
More recent financial market literature has attempted to explain discriminatory 
credit rationing by considering "legal" and "social'' constraints, high screening costs. and 
most convincingly, assymetry of information in credit markets (for details, see Hodg-
man [JC)(>O], Jaffee and Modigliani [1W>9l. Jaffee and Russell [197(>], Azzi and Cox 
[ JfJ7b], Baltcnspcrgcr [I !J7R], Keeton [ 1979]. Stiglitz and Weiss [I ')81], Devinney [ J 9R{l], 
and Bester [I fJR 7]). 
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This more recent literature, however, has not explained how the credit rationing 
process takes place. Presumably, it is considered that the discriminatory process is car-
ricd out by random rejection. However, this is clearly unrealistic. 
Recently, rural financial market literature has identified cheap-credit policies and 
high operational costs per unit of money loaned as some of the most important factors 
causing the disappointing results observed in rural credit programs.1 It has been 
argued that cheap-credit policies tend to create excess demand thereby forcing agricul-
turallenders to ration credit through non-price mechanisms. Since operational costs and 
associated risks in servicing large rural producers are lower than those associated with 
small producers, the agricultural lender is motivated to favor the largest farmers in 
order to reduce per unit lending costs [Gonzalez-Vega, 1984a]. 
Traditionally, empirical studies have established discrimination against some 
class(es) of borrowers (or regions, etc.) by checking whether the dummy variabk: for 
a selected class of bL)rrowers (or region, or agricultural activity) is significant in a linear 
discriminant, probil, or logit function. However, if the dummy variable coefficient for 
the scleckd class l)f borrowers is negative and statistically significant in a discriminant 
function, this cannot be interpreted as evidence of discrimination since linear discrimi-
nant, probil, or logit models are of reduced (single equation) form variety. Hence, it is 
not possible to determine whether the dummy variable for some class of borrowers (or 
region, or agricultural activity) is negative because of the demand or the supply func-
tion. 
This can be bcllcr explained through an example. Let's assume that we attempt to 
determine if a cla<;s of borrowers denoted as JNJ) has been discriminated against in a 
typical credit program hy checking the sign and statistical significance of the dummy 
For an c\knsivc cl!lalysis (I{ tilL' irnpact or clwap-crcdit policies on rural credit mar-
!..cts clr. Adarns, <lraham, and \\m J>isch!..c [I 1JH...J]. 
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variable IND in a probit model. Let's assume that the coefficient obtained for this class 
of borrowers in the probit model is negative and statistically significant. Hence, the 
prohit analysis concludes that IND borrowers have been discriminated against in the 
credit market. Now, let's assume that we also attempt to analyze if this class of borrow-
ers OND) have been discriminated against by estimating the following simultaneous 
equation model: 
(1.1) 
where IND is the dummy variable corresponding to the class of borrowers under stud:y; 
r is the loan rate of interest; X 1 and X 2 are vectors of explanatory variables; CY s and {3 s 
arc parameters; and ,a 1 and ,a2 are disturbance errors. Assume that, after solving the 
model specified above by appropriate methods, o· 1 is negative .. and statistically signifi-
cant in the demand function, but {3 1 is not statistically different from zero i.e., IND hor-
rowers demand less than other classes. but in terms of granted loans they are not differ-
ent from other groups. In other words, IND borrowers are not experiencing 
discrimination in the market, contrary to the discriminant analysis remit. Consequent-
ly, in order to analyze discriminatory credit rationing in rural credit markets one has to 
have a well defined loan demand and loan supply model. 
The main objective of this paper is to discuss appropriate procedures for analyzing 
discriminatory credit rationing in rural credit markets with non-negotiable (or exogc-
nous) interest rates. The specific objective is to analyze if there was any discriminahH·y 
credit rationin~, in lending activities or a Portuguese rural credit protl.rtnn (till' Fundo 
de Mcllu)J'anwnto Agricola) after the I cn.:l !~evolution which changed from a dicta-
h) rial to a more democratic (socialist oricn ted) regime. The analysis is carried out 
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through a loan demand and loan supply model with explicit consideration of a non-
negotiable interest rate (imposed from outside), and the criteria by which credit appli-
cations were accepted or rejected. 
I. THE :MODEL 
The model considered in this study draws on that of Nelson [1977] for labor markets, 
and Maddala and Trost [1982] for Joan market<>. The model applies to non-negotiated 
agricultural loans where the rate of interest for each loan transaction is not determined 
by the intersection of the demand and supply functions but is exogenously imposed 
from outside. We will assume that the ith loan applicant demands an amount 1.~ at the 
fixed interest rate, r. The agricultural lender, on the other hand, after evaluating the 
applicant's available informational set, will decide on the the maximum loan amount L~ 
that it is willing to offer this customer (Aguilera, 19YO). Jf L~·.::::;:L~; the loan transaction 
will take place. If it is not •. the loan rcquc~t will be rejected. The model lll~\Y be rcprc-
sentcd c1s follmvs: 
(1.2) 
( 1.3) 
i=l, .... ,n (applicants), 
where L:' is the loan request from the ith applicant; L~ is the maximum amount that 
the lender is willing to offer to the ith applicant given the available information on 
that borrmvcr; r is the fixed interest rate: Xi is a K-clement vector of observable expla-
natory variables: and JL 1 and p 2 arv random disturbances that follow a bivariate hi nor-
mal distribution with zero mean vector and unknown variances and covarianccs, 
o 1, o 2, and o 12• Both disturbances arc assunwd tn be independent of X1• 
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The criteria by which the lender decides to grant or reject a loan may be reprc-
sented as follows: 
II D . f I. D ~] s_· .. , I - ~ -I = I ~ ~ 
'i 0, if L > L' 
1 1 
( 1.4) 
where L 1 is the observed loan amount. The criteria function (4) defines two sets of 
observations: n0 , the subset of rej<.::cted loans; and the subset n I' the subset of granted 
loans. Since the system of equations (2)-(4) is a simultaneous equations model with 
censoring? an identification problem arises. Given the fact that the model is similar to 
that of Nelson [1977], the necessary condition for identification of the system requires 
one restriction amnng the set {3 2 , a 2 , o 12• For example, if some element of {3 2 is 
restricted to zero, the necessary condition is satisfied, even in the case that the corrc-
sponding clement in {3 1 is non-zero. Likewise, restricting o 12 to zero is suff'icient for 
identification (for details see Nelson, l CJ77). 
The more appropriate cstimatinn procedure of the model is the J\1aximUill LiJ...cli-· 
hood technique. Following Nelson [ 1977], the model may be estimated <:1s follows: 
Since, the data on the amount a Joan applicant requests is usually available, and assurn-
ing that the necessary conditions for identification arc satisfied, then the demand func-
lion may be estimated by ordinary least squares lOLS). The supply function (3), in 
turn, may be estimated with a simple probit model with a known threshold. From cri-
t.cria function (4) we know that whenever Ls~L0 the loan is granted. Hence, by 
Thus, the likelihood function for the model may be written as 
2 Not icc that L~ is never nb:;crvcd. 
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( 1.5) 
where the first product is over all observations for denied loans, and the second is for 
all obscrvatitms for granted loans; and cJ:> is the unit normal distribution function. 
The likelihood function 5 suggests that if the loan amount demanded is not consid-
ered in the estimation of the discriminant function, a specification error will arise. It 
also suggests that, unlike the case of the normal probit model, since the amount of loan 
demanded (L11 ) is observed, we will be able to estimate a 2; the reciprocal of the coeffi-
cient for I .n. 
II. THE DATA 
The data for this study arc described in detail in Mansinho [I CJ90]. The data for 
this study consist of 51)80 lmln applications during 1974-1979 from the Fwu/u til' 
M dllo1ww 'lllu .•\grimlu (hereafter called Hvl/\) std tis lie'>, a classic supply leading ag,ri-
cultured credit prugro!JJ lll<-tn<:tgcd throug!J the .tvlinislry of Agriculture in Portuge:tl 1 Will 
the late 1 C)40s to 1979. The period 1974-1 CJ79 was chosen to investigate the impact on 
the loan portfolio of the economic and political changes that occurred in Portugal 
after the 1974 Revolution. The data terminates in 1979 the last year that the FMJ\ 
operated. Table 1 presents the definition of the variables used in this study. 
VARIABLE 
INT 
LOAND 
TYPE OF 
AGRE 
COOP 
IND 
Table 1 
DEFINITION OF VARIABLES USED IN TIIIS STUDY 
DESCRIPTION 
Interest rate on loan 
Amount in Contos of loan demanded (basis 1976). 
BORROWERS ....................................... . 
Dummy 1 if member of the agrarian reform sector 
Dummy 1 if cooperative 
Dummy 1 if individual 
COLLATERAL ............................................. . 
MORTG Dummy = 1 if mortgage collateral 
TYPE OF 
SOIL 
FRUIT 
LIVEST 
CUL 
INDUS 
REGION 
NORTH 
SOUTH 
CENTER 
LISE 
INVESTMENT ...................................... . 
Dummy 1 if soil preparation or irrigation 
Dummy 1 if fruits 
Dummy 1 if livestock 
Dummy 1 if horticulture 
Dummy 1 if agroindustry food crops 
Dummy 
Dummy 
Dummy 
Dummy 
1 if north 
1 if south 
1 if center. 
1 if Lisbon 
TIME DELAY IN LOAN DISBURSEMENT ...................... ~ .. . 
DELAUT Number of months to disburse a loan. 
Ill. THE RESULTS 
The estimated demand and supply model is the following: 
Supply: L =o<>+o 11\T+o J.O:\\'D+Cl' aere+n COOP+n \.JORT+o SOIL+a 7FRL 2 j ~- ..l .., b 
7 
+Cl'cLI\'lSI'+o..,I\J)LS+a 1 \iOWrJ 1+0' 1 S<>LTI l+o 1 ,CE\+f.l, ( 1.7) 0 () J • -
wllcrc I. is the durnllly variabk· ddincd as follows 
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I · {= 1, if loan is granted 
~ = 0 otherwise 
The variable~ are defined in Table 1. The re~ul1~ of the demand and supply model with 
exogenous intcre~t rates are set forth in Table 2. The supply equation was estimated by 
probit model. The demand equation, in turn, wa~ estimated by ordinary least squares. 
The Results 
The interest rate coefficient CINT) shows, as expected, a positive and highly signifi-
cant sign ( t-ratio I 8.5, significant at 1 percent level) in the supply function, and a neg-
ative but insignifiu-·mt sign in the demand function. The insignificant sign for INT in 
the demand function is not surprising if we consider the non-ncgot iable nature of the 
fixed interest rate in this credit program: The bormwcr 'must' accept the offered inter-
est rate. 
The negative and significant sign ( t-ratio -2.3, significant at 5 JX'rcent level) for 
I .0/\ND (the requested loan amount) indicates that applicants demanding large loan 
sizes were discriminated against in the program. This rt..>sult makes sense if we consider 
that the socialist government after the 1974 I~cvolution was more inclined to favor 
small rural producers. 
The sign obtained for 'MORTG in both the supply and the demand function provide 
us with an interesting result. Contrary to our expectations, the applicant's ability to 
provide mortgage as collateral, instmd of cwp lien pledges, is negatively correlated with 
the probability of getting a loan. This result suggests that mort~.agc collateral was not 
considcn·d by thv lender as a risk-rvducin!' rncchanism. It appmrs to he that thl' ability 
of' providing mortg<:tgc as collatcrcll was nm'>idcrcd by the lender as a sign of high 
innHnv tlwn a ri-,k--rcdul in~·. rnvd1dnism. lhl· pnsitive nwrel<ltion between income and 
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the ability of providing mortga~,c collateral is reflected in the positive sign obtained for 
MORTG in the demand function. Thus, if MORTG is a proxy for the applicants' 
income, we may conclude that large-income loan applicants were discriminated against 
in this credit program. This result is perfectly consistent with the socialist orientation of 
the po~:t-revolutionary regime in Portugal. 
Another interesting result is provided by the negative and significant sign obtained 
for DELAUT in the demand function. This indicates that delays in loan disbursement 
created a negative incentive on the demand side. Delaying the loan disbursement can be 
interpreted as increasing borrowers' transaction costs. Thus, it is quite reasonable a neg-
ative sign appears for DELAUT in the demand function. 
Discriminatory Credit Rationing by Type of Bonm.vcr. 
The negative and significant sign obtained for COOP in the supply function, and its 
positive and significant sign in the demand function suggest that during the post-
revolution period a)?ricultural farmers as-;ocialed with private larnwr cooperatives 
were highly discriminalt:d <tgainst by the l·ldXs man<lgcmcnL .1\t!rarian rdonn benefi-
ciaries, on the other hand, were highly favored during this same period of time. These 
results make sense if we consider the nature of the new regime established after the 
1974 Revolution in Portugal. 
Discriminatory Credit Rationing by Type of Activity. 
The signs and statistical significance obtained for agricultural activity variables 
allow us to conclude that the FM.i\ tended to favor soil preparation and irrigation, live-
stock, and industrial food crop invcstrncnt. In fact, thl' sign and significance of the cod-
fidcnts I or SOIL, LI\TST, and lN])U') arc <:Ill positive and highly significant, whilv 
horticulture, and fruit <Ktivitics tended to be discriminat(.'{l against. 
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Discriminatory Credit Rationing by Region. 
The analysis of the sign and significance permit us to conclude that the FMA cred-
it program tended to favor applicants from the north, while applicants from the south 
(a region with the large concentration of larger farms) tended to be discriminated 
against. Effl'ctively, the sign obtained for NORTH in the supply function is positive 
and moderately significant (t-ratio 1.7, significant at 10 percent level). The sign 
obtained for SOUTH in the supply function, in turn, is negative and highly significant 
(t-ratio -1.9, significant at 5 percent level). 
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Table 2 
ESTI~l/\TES OF LO/\N SlJPJ>LY /\ND DEMAND MODEL WITll FIXED INTEREST 
RATE 
Pooled time series cross-section data: Fwulo de Me/lwmmcnto Agricola (FMA) Portu-
gal I <J7..t-1 <J7<). 
VARIABLE SUPPLY(PROBIT) DEMAND (OLS) 
INTERCEPT -1.56 ( -2.2)* -0.01 ( -0.1) 
INT 0.002 ( 18.5)** -0.001 ( -0.6) 
LOAND -0.02 ( -2.3)* 
MORTG -0.16 ( -3.9)** 0.22 ( 5.5)** 
DELAUT -0.01 ( -2.3)* 
TYPE OF BORROWERS ............................................ . 
AGRE 
COOP 
0.12 ( 2.4)* 
-0.40 ( -5.6)** 
0.14 ( 
0.78 ( 
3.4)*'~-
3.9)'* 
TYPE OF INVESTMENT ........................................... . 
SOIL 
FRUIT 
LIVEST 
INDUS 
0.78 
0.09 
0.69 
1.09 
( 
( 
( 
( 
9.0)** 
0.8) 
7.3)*' 
6.9)** 
0.36 ( 3.4)U 
0.59 ( 3.6)'* 
0.34 ( 2. 3)' 
5.20 ( 7.3)'* 
REGION ....................................................... . 
NORTH 0.10 ( 1.7) -0.03 
SOUTH -0.06 ( -1.9)* -0.13 
CENTER 0.02 ( 0.3) -0.29 
RSQ 
F-STAT. 
Total number of observations = 5980 
Number of Loan Applicants Rejected = 2319. 
Number of Loan Applicants Accepted = 3661. 
( 
-0.3) 
( -2.0)* 
( -3.6)** 
.24 
152.9 
RSQ = R-square between observed and predicted. 
F-STAT = F-Statistic 
Figures in parentheses are asymptotic t-ratios for the 
supply function, and exact t-ratios for the demand function. 
*~ significant at l percent level. 
significant at 5 percent level. 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS 
The present paper argued that in order to analyze discriminatory credit rationing 
in rural credit programs, one should have a well-defined demand and supply rmxlel, 
which should be estimated by using not only data on loans granted, but also on loans 
denied. Moreover, the estimation of the supply function should be estimated consider-
ing the loan amount demanded as an additional explanatory variable, otherwise there 
would be a specification error in the model. 
The paper illustrates the loan demand and loan supply model with non-negotiable 
loan contracts using loan information provided by a Portuguese agricultural develop-
ment institution, the Fwzdo de A1elhommento Agricola during Hw period 
1974-1979. The 1974 Revolution changed a dictatorial regime to a more democratic 
(socialist oriented) regime with a completely different social and economic pvrspeclive 
than the old regime. 
The results show a clear discrimination against large farmers, f<trlllers associated 
with private cooperatives, horticulture and fruits activities, and applicants frolll south-
ern Portugal. These results reflect the socialist character of the new regime established 
in Portugal during the period under study. 
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